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Since 1984, the U.S. economy has grown at a remarkably steady pace. An analysis of this
increased stability shows that every major component of GDP has exhibited smoother growth.
However, two components—inventory investment and consumer spending—are responsible for
the bulk of the decline in overall volatility.
Over the last decade and a half, the United States 
has experienced an unprecedented period of stable 
economic growth. Indeed, in the period since 1984, the
volatility of quarterly real GDP growth has been only
half that of the preceding twenty-five years. This 
pronounced decline in aggregate volatility invites us 
to take a closer look at the volatility trends within
important components of real GDP—specifically, con-
sumer spending, residential and business investment,
government purchases, and international trade. To what
extent has each of these sectors shared in the increased
stability of the overall economy? 
In this edition of Current Issues, we address this
question by comparing the volatility of growth exhib-
ited by each component before and after 1984. We also
seek to identify those components that contributed the
most to the overall drop in growth variability.1
Our analysis reveals that the growth rates of all the
major components of GDP have followed a steadier
course, with the most marked reductions in volatility
occurring in residential investment and trade. When we
weigh each component by its share in overall economic
growth, however, inventory investment and consumer
spending emerge as the chief contributors to the increased
stability of the economy since 1984. Because inventory
investment’s share of GDP is very small, the important
role played by this component is particularly striking.
We also examine the composition of the more stable
economy across the stages of the business cycle. We
find that the growth of GDP and its components has
been smoother in both recessions and expansions. Thus,
the drop in volatility cannot be attributed solely to a
simple decline in the number and severity of recessions
in recent years. 
Two Types of Explanations
Increased stability in the growth of aggregate GDP and
its individual components may reflect two broad types
of changes in the economic environment since the early
1980s. First, structural changes—such as technological
innovations and regulatory shifts—may have helped
smooth economic fluctuations in some sectors. Indeed,
in the early 1980s, many structural changes were under
way that may have improved certain sectors’ ability to
respond to changes in demand and to absorb economic
shocks. These improvements, in turn, could have led to
more stable growth.
The second type of explanation—while potentially
important—goes far beyond the scope of the simple
decomposition analysis presented here. This explanation
relates to the role of monetary policy and economic
shocks in the variability of economic growth. It is possible
that a stabilizing monetary policy and smaller economic
shocks—“good policy and good luck”—may have played
a role in the decline of overall volatility.2 While this
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second explanation clearly deserves further research, we
focus our analysis solely on possible structural explana-
tions for the more stable growth. 
The Decline in the Volatility of GDP Growth 
A glance at the path of real GDP growth in recent
decades suggests that volatility dropped markedly not
long after the 1981-82 recession (Chart 1). Employing
advanced statistical techniques, McConnell and Perez
Quiros (1998) identify the date of the volatility drop 
in GDP growth as the first quarter of 1984. In our
analysis, we use this date to split our sample into two
periods: 1959-83 and 1984-98. When we calculate the
volatility of GDP growth—measured by the standard
deviation of quarterly growth rates—for each of the two
periods, we find a significant 2.2 percentage point drop
from the first period to the second.3
Similar calculations for the growth rates of the major
components of GDP show that all have become less
volatile in the later period (Table 1). Residential invest-
ment, exports, and imports experienced the largest
absolute declines in growth volatility, while federal
government purchases and consumer spending experi-
enced the smallest reductions in volatility. The fact that
growth patterns in each of the major components of
GDP reflected the decline in aggregate volatility is not
surprising. Income and spending patterns in a particular
sector often depend to some extent on developments in
other sectors. Thus, greater stability in one component
of GDP likely reflects more stable growth in other
areas. We do not, however, attempt to separate out these
spillover effects in our analysis. Instead, we seek clues
about the underlying sources of more stable growth by
focusing on those components that experienced the
largest reductions in growth variability.
We look first at residential investment. The size of
quarterly fluctuations in the growth of this component
has shrunk significantly—from an average of 23.9 per-
cent in 1959-83 to 11.6 percent in 1984-98 (Chart 2).
Regulatory and structural changes in the 1980s very
likely contributed to the sector’s stability, largely by
enabling banks and other financial institutions to stabi-
lize the supply of funds for housing investment. For
example, the federal government’s elimination of the
interest rate ceilings imposed on bank deposits by
Regulation Q curbed the outflow of funds from banks
during periods of high or rising rates and helped ensure
that these institutions would have the means to continue
their mortgage lending.4 In addition, the development of
the market for mortgage-backed securities and the
increased use of interest rate swaps permitted banks and
other financial institutions to better hedge their exposure
to changes in interest rates. In turn, the lowering of inter-
est rate risk may have allowed these institutions to offer
a more stable supply of funds for housing investment.
Growth in both imports and exports also exhibited a
striking decline in volatility. The gradual breakdown of
trading barriers around the world over the past twenty
years is one possible explanation for the decrease in
trade volatility. For example, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade and other international agreements
Chart 1
Real Gross Domestic Product









98 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 1959
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National 
Income and Product Accounts.
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Table 1
Volatility of Growth in Real GDP and Its Components
Standard Deviations of Annualized Quarterly Growth Rates
Standard Deviation
1959-83 1984-98 Difference
GDP 4.4 2.2 -2.2
Consumer spending
Goods 4.7 3.8 -0.9
Services 1.9 1.5 -0.4
Investmenta
Residential 23.9 11.6 -12.3
Business fixed 10.0 7.9 -2.1
Government purchases
Federal 7.5 7.2 -0.3
State and local 4.1 2.1 -2.0
Net exports
Exports 18.8 7.7 -11.1
Imports 17.8 7.8 -10.0
Source: Authors’calculations, based on U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
aExcludes inventory investment. Growth rates cannot be calculated for inventory 
investment because levels of this subcomponent are sometimes negative.have eliminated many barriers to the trade of manu-
factured goods. With more markets open to U.S. goods,
firms here can minimize risk and achieve steadier
growth by exporting their products to a broad range of
countries. 
Changes in the composition of trade may also have
helped increase stability in trade. U.S. import growth
may be smoother because import shares of relatively
volatile commodities such as food, petroleum, and
industrial materials have fallen significantly in the last
fifteen years. At the same time, services—which tend to
grow at a less variable rate than goods—have accounted
for an increasingly large share of total U.S. exports
since the early 1980s.
In contrast to growth in housing investment and trade,
growth in consumer spending was only slightly less
volatile in the second period than in the first. The size of
quarterly fluctuations in consumer spending growth fell
from an average of 3.3 percent in 1959-83 to 2.1 percent
in 1984-98. As we note below, however, the large size of
this component relative to aggregate GDP makes even a
small decline noteworthy. Some analysts have attributed
the volatility decline in this component to a shift away
from the consumption of goods toward the consumption
of services. To be sure, spending on consumer services
tends to be less volatile than spending on household
goods (particularly consumer durables). Our results,
however, show that growth variability dropped in both
categories of spending and that the decrease for goods
was large relative to that for services (Table 1). Thus, a
shift toward spending on services is at best a partial
explanation for the more stable growth in overall con-
sumer spending.5 Moreover, of all the GDP compo-
nents, consumer spending has likely benefited the most
from the spillover effects of increased stability in other
parts of the economy. In particular, reduced volatility in
all categories of GDP tends to lead to steadier growth in
income and, consequently, in household spending. 
Growth Contributions and the Decline in Volatility 
So far we have explored the changes in the volatility of
growth rates for the individual components of GDP. 
We now assess the extent to which these changes have
helped bring about the increased stability of aggregate
growth. To do so, we calculate the volatility of each
component’s contribution to real GDP growth. This
“growth contribution” is, roughly speaking, the real
growth rate of the component multiplied by the compo-
nent’s share of total GDP.6 Unlike growth rates, growth
contributions take into account the size of each compo-
nent relative to GDP and provide a convenient measure
for “adding up” the components of output growth. The
volatility of each component’s growth contribution over
the two sample periods gives us our measure of that
component’s contribution to the decline in aggregate
volatility.7 Significantly, we can obtain such measures
for two components of GDP for which growth rates 
cannot be calculated—inventory investment (a subcom-
ponent of investment) and net exports.
Our calculations reveal that the most important 
contributor to the overall reduction in the variability 
of aggregate GDP growth is inventory investment
(Table 2).8 As the table shows, the volatility of inven-
tory investment’s growth contribution fell from an 
average of 2.9 percent in the 1959-83 period to 1.7 per-
cent in the 1984-98 period. Inventory investment’s 
large contribution to the increase in the stability of
aggregate GDP growth is striking: this component
accounts for just 1 percent of total output. Despite its
small role in overall economic activity, the component
has historically contributed the greatest degree of
volatility to growth in GDP.
The reduction in the volatility of inventory invest-
ment’s growth contribution was particularly important
during the most recent recession. In the recessions that
took place during the 1959-83 period, declines in inven-
tory investment accounted for almost the entire drop in
real output. In the 1990-91 recession, however, inven-
tory investment accounted for only about a third of the
peak-to-trough decline in real GDP. 
Why has the variability in this segment of the 
economy experienced such a steep decline in recent
years? One explanation may be that during the 1980s,
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GDP volatility breaklarge-scale structural changes in inventory management.
Many of these changes—including the move to “just-
in-time” computer-based inventory management and
ordering systems—may have had the effect of smooth-
ing inventory investment by reducing both the average
level and the variability of inventory stocks relative to
demand. 
Consider, for example, the adoption of just-in-time
ordering methods. A monthly survey conducted by the
National Association of Purchasing Managers shows
that firms have significantly reduced the number of
days in advance of production that they order their
materials and supplies. The average lead time from
January 1961 to December 1983 was seventy-two days;
this figure dropped to forty-nine days for the 1984-97
period (Chart 3). By purchasing materials much closer
to the actual date of production, firms can react more
quickly to unexpected shifts in demand and thus avoid
extreme fluctuations in inventories.9
Aggregate data on inventory investment provide 
evidence that the structural changes undertaken in the
early 1980s have helped companies to both reduce their
investment in inventories and stabilize their inventories
relative to demand. The mean of inventory investment
as a share of final sales was lower in 1984-98 than in
1959-83. The variability of the inventory-to-sales ratio
also declined from the earlier to the later period.
Consumer spending is the next largest contributor to
the increase in stability—the volatility of this compo-
nent’s growth contribution fell from an average of 
2.5 percent to 1.4 percent. This finding is less surpris-
ing than our results for inventory investment. Because
consumption accounts for almost two-thirds of aggre-
gate GDP, even relatively modest declines in volatility
can significantly quell overall volatility. 
The other GDP components that experienced large
outright declines in the volatility of growth contributed
much less to the stability apparent in aggregate GDP over
the 1984-98 period. The residential investment sector
accounts for only about 5 percent of economic output.
Thus, the decline in the volatility of its growth contribu-
tion was relatively small even though the variability of its
growth rate fell sharply. The same is true for exports,
which account for just 10 percent of real aggregate GDP,
and imports, which account for 11 percent of GDP.
Growth Variability across the Business Cycle
From 1984 to 1998, the United States experienced one
mild recession, from third-quarter 1990 through first-
quarter 1991. By contrast, over the preceding twenty-
five years, the economy underwent five recessions; two
of those downturns—1973-75 and 1981-82—were rela-
tively severe. Not surprisingly, an argument has been
made that the decline in the volatility of aggregate GDP
growth can be attributed almost entirely to the lack of
protracted recessions in the later period. But if the
absence of recessions is in fact the reason for steadier
growth, we would expect GDP growth during 1984-98
expansions to show roughly the same degree of volatil-
ity as in earlier expansions. To determine if this is the
case, we eliminate recessions from our analysis and
recalculate the volatility of GDP growth for the two
sample periods. Our results show that the standard
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Table 2
Volatility of GDP Components’ Growth Contributions
Standard Deviations of Annualized Quarterly Growth Contributions 
Standard Deviation
1959-83 1984-98 Difference
Consumer spending 2.5 1.4 -1.1
Investment
Residential 1.1 0.5 -0.6
Business fixed  1.3 0.9 -0.4
Inventory investment 2.9 1.7 -1.2
Government purchases
Federal 0.9 0.6 -0.3
State and local  0.6 0.2 -0.4
Net exports 1.3 1.0 -0.3
Exports 1.1 0.8 -0.3
Imports 1.2 0.9 -0.3
Source: Authors’calculations, based on U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
Note: Data are standard deviations of growth contributions; they do not sum to
the standard deviation in GDP growth.   
Source: National Association of Purchasing Managers. 
Note: The shaded areas denote periods designated recessions by the National
Bureau of Economic Research. 
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1961 65deviation of real quarterly GDP growth fell substan-
tially during expansions alone—from 3.5 percent in the
1959-83 period to 1.8 percent in the 1984-98 period. 
By removing recessions from our analysis, we might
also expect to see a change in the relative contributions
of different GDP components to the decline in volatility
(Table 3). For example, we know that changes in inven-
tory investment have historically accounted for a large
portion of the fluctuations in GDP during recessions.
Consequently, if we discount the recessions, the role of
inventory investment in bringing about smoother GDP
growth might prove much smaller. We find, however,
that while the decline in the volatility of this compo-
nent’s growth contribution shrinks somewhat, inventory
investment remains one of the two most important con-
tributors to the increased stability of growth. Overall,
the pattern observed during expansions closely mirrors
that observed for the 1959-98 period: the variability of
the growth contributions of all major GDP components
declined after the early 1980s.
Conclusion
In this edition of Current Issues, we have examined
changes in the volatility of growth in the major compo-
nents of aggregate GDP since the early 1980s. We have
shown that the growth rates of all the components
became less volatile after 1983, with residential invest-
ment and trade experiencing the largest decreases. Data
on the growth contributions of the GDP components,
however, indicate that two components—inventory
investment and consumer spending—were particularly
important in accounting for the overall decline in
volatility. Moreover, the analysis shows that the volatil-
ity break is evident in both economic expansions and
recessions. This finding suggests that the increase in the
stability of growth cannot be attributed solely to the
mildness of the 1990-91 downturn. 
The composition of the variability of growth gives
some clues to the causes and consequences of the less
volatile economy. Our decomposition suggests that
structural, regulatory, and institutional changes over the
past fifteen to twenty years have contributed to lower
volatility in several sectors—housing investment, trade,
and most notably, inventory investment. These changes
could have promoted stability by muting the way eco-
nomic shocks and policy changes are transmitted
through various sectors. As we have seen, regulatory
change and financial market innovation may have
helped ease the sensitivity of housing investment to
changes in interest rates; trade liberalization may have
opened up new markets and insulated U.S. exporters
against sudden changes in demand from existing 
customers; and inventory management reforms may
have enabled U.S. manufacturers to adjust more quickly
and flexibly to shifts in demand.
Is the less volatile growth in GDP and its components
likely to continue? If a stabilizing monetary policy and
smaller economic shocks—developments not explored
here—largely explain the steadier growth in GDP, then
the recent period of stability may continue only as long
as “good policy and good luck” last. By contrast, if
structural changes—including those discussed above—
have muted the transmission of policy shifts and 
economic shocks through the economy, then the
increased stability we have experienced since 1984 may
become a permanent feature of U.S. economic growth.
Notes
1. A number of recent studies have explored the increased stability
of the U.S. economy. McConnell and Perez Quiros (1998) estimate a
break in growth variability in the first quarter of 1984 and attribute
the break to a reduction in the share of durable goods output
accounted for by inventory investment. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1998) investigate how monetary policy may affect stability, and
Filardo (1997) examines whether the decline in manufacturing and
the rise in services may have contributed to increased stability.
In addition, the business press has reported on the increased sta-
bility of the U.S. economy. See, for example, “Those Vicious
Business Cycles, Tamed but Not Quite Slain,” New York Times,
January 2, 1997.
2. For example, the economy has not experienced a large, sustained
negative supply shock since the oil price increases of the 1970s. In
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Table 3
Volatility of GDP Components’ Growth Contributions
during Expansions
Standard Deviations of Annualized Quarterly Growth Contributions
Standard Deviation
1959-83 1984-98 Difference
GDP 3.5 1.8 -1.7
Consumer spending 2.2 1.2 -1.0
Investment
Residential 0.9 0.4 -0.5
Business fixed  1.3 0.9 -0.4
Inventory investment 2.6 1.7 -0.9
Government purchases
Federal 0.9 0.6 -0.3
State and local  0.6 0.2 -0.4
Net exports 1.2 1.0 -0.2
Exports 1.2 0.8 -0.4
Imports 1.1 0.8 -0.3
Source: Authors’calculations, based on U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
Notes: Data are standard deviations of growth contributions; they do not sum to
the standard deviation in GDP growth.  Economic expansions are all quarters
between 1959 and 1998 except periods designated recessions by the National
Bureau of Economic Research. If we exclude the two quarters before and after
each recession, we obtain qualitatively similar results.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
addition, inflation since 1984 has been generally stable or declining
(except for 1988), and monetary policy—at least as measured by
short-term interest rates—has been more stable than during the pre-
vious twenty-five years.
3. In this article, the volatility of growth is measured as the stan-
dard deviation of quarterly growth rates over a particular time
period. The standard deviation of growth—which is measured in
percentage points—is the square root of the variance of growth. The 
variance of growth is the average of the squared deviations of indi-
vidual quarterly growth rates from the average growth rate over a
particular time period. 
4. Before this change took effect, a rise in market interest rates
above the Regulation Q ceilings (triggered, for example, by a tight-
ening of monetary policy) would prompt corporations and others to
move their funds out of low-yielding bank deposits and into assets
offering a higher rate of return. As a result, banks and other finan-
cial intermediaries experienced a sharp reduction in the funds
available for mortgage lending, and housing activity declined
accordingly. Several studies (including Ryding 1990 and Throop
1986) have shown that the elimination of interest rate ceilings has
reduced the sensitivity of housing investment to changes in interest
rates and monetary policy.
5. Our skeptical assessment of the effects of the shift to a services
economy is consistent with Filardo (1997). Filardo concludes that
this shift has had little impact on the business cycle. He emphasizes
that while employment in manufacturing as a share of total employ-
ment has fallen in recent years, productivity gains in manufacturing
have kept the sector’s share of total output relatively stable.
6. For details on how the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) cal-
culates chain-weighted growth contributions, see Seskin and Parker
(1998). The BEA’s calculation of growth contributions for chain-
weighted estimates of real GDP is more complicated than our simple
description would suggest. It requires appropriate weighting
based on the “chained” weights for different output components
in a particular period. By definition, the sum of the growth con-
tributions for real consumer spending, business and residential
investment, government consumption and investment, and net
exports must be equal to the growth rate of real GDP.
7. Covariances between the growth contributions of individual
components also contribute to aggregate growth volatility. For the
GDP components, changes in the covariances of growth contribu-
tions were in line with their volatility changes.
8. Using more rigorous tests for structural breaks in a time series,
McConnell and Perez Quiros (1998) conclude that inventory invest-
ment is the only component of real GDP growth that experienced a
statistically significant decline in volatility after 1984. 
9. We focus here on the effect of changes in inventory holdings on
quarter-to-quarter fluctuations in GDP. Other researchers have
examined whether changes in inventory management have affected
the business cycle. For example, see Bechter and Stanley (1993),
Filardo (1995), and Morgan (1991).
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